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Abstract 
Previous papers mostly dealt with specific views of information security management (either tech-
nical, organizational for instance). Recently, major progress has been achieved in the development 
of a business driven approach with BORIS (Business Oriented management of Information Secu-
rity) and a process-oriented approach called ORBIT (Operational Risks in Business and IT). An 
integrated framework is being described in this paper that bases on the beneficial and complemen-
tary merge of both approaches. It supports management of an enterprise’s information security 
functions with a strong economic focus whereby it specifically links business and information secu-
rity objectives. The methodology to be presented has proven to be reliable, user friendly, consistent 
and precise under real conditions over several years in enterprises with world wide presence. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Situation 
 
Several models, methods and measures were introduced in the past each covering particular aspects 
of Information Security (IS) or information risk management. Most of the approaches focus primar-
ily on technical issues but recently, also business oriented approaches for managing IS can be iden-
tified in the literacy (i.e. [1], [16]). But again, many of the approaches mainly focus on specialized 
fields without meeting the challenges of a holistically integrated and practicable concept. They lack 
in integrating the different interests of relevant actors and even more important, they lack in estab-
lishing a system that transparently links business with IS objectives and measures as well as these 
objectives and measures with a method for defining optimal investment policies. To handle these 
challenges, a framework for managing IS with a strong economic focus is presented in the follow-
ing. This starts with the clarification of the appreciation of used terms and intended goals. 
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1.2. Terms 
 
Information in this paper is defined as an explanatory, significant assertion that is part of the overall 
knowledge as well as it is can be seen as specific, from human beings interpreted technical or non-
technical processed data [7]. This definition is precisely in line with the ISO/IEC standards which 
state that information “can exist in many forms. It can be printed or written on paper, stored elec-
tronically, transmitted by post or by using electronic means, shown on films, or spoken in conversa-
tion” [9]. 
 
As consequence of the appreciation of information, IS has to cover technical as well as non-
technical topics. In this context, the ISO/IEC declares that whatever “form the information takes, or 
means by which it is shared or stored, it should always be appropriately protected. IS is the protec-
tion of information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize 
business risk, and maximize return on investments and business opportunities” [9]. 
 
1.3. Goals 
 
The goals defined in this paper are in line with findings in several topic-near publications like [5] 
and [6], added with the result of several discussions to scientist, practitioners, and of reviews of 
content related papers [17]. 
 
R1: As IS is seen as business and strategic management topic, the Information Security Manage-
ment (ISM) framework then has to enable executives to transparently link business to IS objectives.  
R2: The framework should support to answer questions about IS performance as well as it should 
support to address areas suitable or necessary to improve the performance influencing indicators. 
R3: The process of defining concrete and measurable indicators for the security target as well as for 
the current state in different levels of detail should be supported.  
R4: To close identified gaps, especially investment decisions have to be addressed in the context of 
the regarded business oriented management framework. Thereby, executives should be given sup-
port for the processes of finding and defining cost benefit balanced investment strategies.  
R5: When measures are running, the framework should offer a method for evaluation that can also 
be used for optimizing the economic and strategic performance of the overall IS infrastructure. 
R6: The methods defined have to be integrated into a management process that enables the con-
tinuously and especially sustainable business oriented ISM. 
 
To fulfil the requirements respectively to reach the goals, the present paper presents two already 
existing components, BORIS (Business Oriented management of Information Security) and ORBIT 
(Operational Risks in Business and IT), as well as it introduces the reader to a data model for the 
coexistence of the currently singularly successfully existent concepts in real environments.  
 
2. BORIS Design 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
To handle especially business oriented ISM issues, a framework for the Business Oriented man-
agement of Information Security (BORIS) was introduced by [17]. As seen in Figure 1, the frame-
work consists of four layers whereby each layer covers particular aspects of strategic, tactical and 
operational ISM challenges. 
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Figure 1: BORIS general topology 
 
The top level focuses on the business and ISM interaction, the second and third layers deal with 
linking the results of the strategic methods to specific IS objectives and with defining a balanced 
investment policy for implementing and managing measures targeted to close identified gaps. The 
fourth layer holds tools for the evaluation and optimization of IS infrastructures while an integrated 
program management rounds the framework of to ensure continuous effort of the tasks of interest. 
As the framework is presented in detail in [17], the current paragraphs have the goal of briefly re-
capitulating major findings and benefits. 
 
2.2. Business Strategic Methods 
 
The top layer of BORIS deals with Business/Information Security Alignment and Performance 
management (BISAP). It consists of a transferring system for linking strategic as well as legal, 
regulatory, standard implied and contractual drivers to IS objectives and a scorecard system with 
which performance is measured. Here, the theoretical basis is laid by the Balanced Scorecard [10] 
that is widely accepted and adopted for several branches and industries as well as the general idea 
is used for years in the context of information management for instance (i.e. [7]).  
 
Because of the aim of connecting the BORIS system with an enterprise Balanced Scorecard, the 
business strategic method defined here integrates IS performance objectives and metrics in the tra-
ditional dimensions finance, customer, processes and future. An organizational dimension is added 
to the system to match with the requirements of several standards which accentuate the importance 
of organizational IS performance as well as a sixth dimension is added which covers the impor-
tance of the technological IS infrastructure. Analogue to the traditional Balanced Scorecard, also 
the dimensions of BISAP are connected through a knowledge-based steering methodology.  
 
The legal, regulatory, standard implied and contractual as well as strategic requirements are trans-
ferred to security objectives by the use of a systematic and formal defined process whereby relevant 
players such as the chief information officer, business process owners, and officers in charge of 
legal affairs for instance have to cooperatively agree to. Transferring tables thereby are offered to 
support this process: Business requirements (formulated in “business language”) here are linked to 
IS requirement without loosing the vital connection between them. It is only this explicitly applied 
connector philosophy between business and ISMS that validates the right to exist to any security 
control.  
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Benchmarking replenishes BISAP. As widely used and accepted method [14] it is anchored in 
BORIS to supports to identify the own level of maturity while the individual records of perfor-
mance are set in relation to a peer group of interest. This offers to benefit from the results if data is 
correctly interpreted and the peers are of adequate competitive importance [13]. For BORIS, the 
Information Security Status Survey provided by the Information Security Forum (ISF) is currently 
used. To transfer benchmarking results in the next step to concrete improvement results, the strate-
gies, objectives and identified gaps between the objectives and the current states in each of the six 
dimensions of the BISAP method are linked to process tactical methods. 
 
2.3. Process Tactical Methods 
 
The Process and Risk Oriented Numerical Outgoings Estimation (PRONOE) method is introduced 
in detail by Tsinas [18]. It is directly linked to BISAP as it uses its output as operational guideline 
while the data processed in PRONOE again is delivered up to layer 1 in an aggregated format. 
PRONOE contains three components [17]: A risk assessment layer for determining the qualitative 
actual and debit, the (100- X)% rule for determining the quantitative debit and a process for the 
cost-benefit balancing comparison of the qualitative and quantitative actual and debit values which 
especially supports to address financial investment policy goals. 
 
Thereby, a management committee , consisting of the persons in charge of business management, 
should determine the objectives what concretely means to agree on a specific level of acceptable 
risk exposure and on the areas which require additional risk controls. This gives the qualitative de-
bit. The qualitative actual then is assessed using common risk assessment methods like scorecards 
for instance. For BORIS, a questionnaire offered by the ISF is used to address the status of the risk 
areas in currently five dimensions [8]: Criticality, Level of threat, Business impact, Vulnerability – 
status of arrangements, and Vulnerability – special circumstances. Recently, effort is spending to 
transform this layer from the proprietary ISF scorecard to an ISO 27001 aligned structure. This 
would allow everybody to use this model, and certainly it would support the ISO dimension with 
eleven risk areas. 
 
The (100- X)% rule transfers the level of acceptable risk to protection areas, defined as 100 percent 
minus the accepted level of risk in percentage. It bases on the assumption that each assertion about 
acceptable risks directly implicates that any further risks are not accepted and that each assertion 
also defines the investment areas necessary to reduce the overlapping risk levels to acceptable ones. 
 
For cost-benefit balancing comparisons, the actual investment situation is assessed and set in rela-
tion to the debits calculated by using the (100-x)% rule. As information is generated here about 
whether the established security level could have been realized using defined resources or whether 
an objective has been left unmet because sufficient resources were not available, this element of 
PRONOE supports to address the appropriateness of the IS investments [12].  
 
2.4. Financial Tactical Methods 
 
Whenever measures have to be implemented in order to reduce defined overlapping risk levels, 
questions about investments on a more detailed level arise. Here, BORIS offers the calculation of 
the Return on Security Investment (RoSI) when accurate data is available. If accurate data is miss-
ing, is not existing or statistically significant, Cost Benefit Sheets (CoBS) as presented by Sowa et 
al. [17] should be used. CoBS are quite similar to the approach of Schneier [15] whereby a system-
atic documentation can enhance CoBS quality as well as it enabled to appropriately justify but also 
revise investment decision.  
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2.5. Operational Evaluation and Optimization 
 
So far, strategic, process and financial tactical methods are introduced and linked to each other 
what demonstrates a closed chain from business to security business management. For rounding of 
the quantum of methods, the operational level of BORIS holds methods for evaluating the current 
controls infrastructure (ECI) as well as for optimizing the necessary controls infrastructure (OCI). 
As a comprehensive method capable to deal with ECI/OCI is presented by Klempt [11], and Klempt 
et al. [14], the authors of the current paper abdicate to discuss the method further on. Instead, the 
method for managing Operational Risks in Business and IT (ORBIT) is introduced in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
3. ORBIT Design 
 
3.1. Overview 
 
Unlike BORIS, ORBIT is a methodology presented first-time in this paper to the scientific commu-
nity. Chronologically it was designed well after BORIS was already implemented and a certain 
level maturity achieved. Thereby, the design of ORBIT benefits of underlying effort in the devel-
opment of BORIS and completes the missing design elements systematically. 
 
ORBIT is a system aiming to control operational risks in business processes in regard to informa-
tion technology consisting of elements called Knowledge Cells (KCs). KCs can be understood as 
data container that incorporate diverse kinds of topic related information and associations that are 
of specific interest for a targeted group of information consumer [2], [3]. The system bases on the 
assumptions that information risks are the primary ones of concern and that technology itself in the 
consequence has no own risks – apart from internal dependencies towards itself (recursion). Addi-
tionally, it is assumed that the requirements of the essential security objectives – availability, inte-
grity, confidentiality and authenticity – are defined within the business processes. From background 
of this, the following KCs lay the foundation of the approach presented here: Business process, IT 
system, application system, threat, risk, and measure. In general, the model could be extended to 
meet the requirements of any kind of operational risks. However, this is not the subject of the paper 
presented. 
 
The KC business process contains the descriptions of an enterprise's core processes, especially in 
regard to the four typical IS objectives while the KC IT system holds information about the enter-
prises’ essential IT systems and networks. In addition to general information, the description here 
also includes the currently achieved degree of performance in regard to the IS objectives of interest, 
for example, the current confidentiality level or availability class. An IT system thereby may be a 
platform that supports 1…n business processes. It directly serves as a support for the business 
process and is described in its own KC. Kinds of threats are also described in a separate KC where-
by a threat is defined as one possible scenario or a threatening potential that could impact IT sys-
tems [4].  
 
Closely related with threats, the KC risk holds information derived from the quantification of poss-
ible threat impacts, whereby common methods like multiplying a probability of occurrence with 
possible impacts are being used. Finally, the KC measure contains possible actions to achieve IS 
objectives. As seen in Figure 2, the KCs are linked to each other whereby attributed associations 
are being used.  
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Figure 2: ORBIT – Typology 
 
3.2. Method 
 
The systemic approach for visualizing the essential IT risks in regard to the core business activities 
of an enterprise implies to logically link the relevant KCs. Thereby, business processes, IT systems 
and risks are of essential importance for what reason their relations and the main connected KCs up 
to measures as seen in Figure 3 are being discussed in more detail in the following.  
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Figure 3: ORBIT – Essential KCs 
 
Business process – IT system: This link enables the identification of dependencies of business 
processes and IT systems. Here, the targeted level, e.g. the required level of availability of an IT 
system for a business process, can be compared to the current condition. Thereby, a requirement is 
fulfilled if all systems comply with the requirements of the particular business process while a re-
quirement is not fulfilled if one or more IT systems deviate from target conditions towards unstable 
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ones. A requirement is surpassed if all IT systems do not undercut the target condition and single 
ones even hold a higher security level. A comparison of target and current conditions allows a ded-
icated assessment of necessary measures on the basis of direct dependencies between business 
processes and IT systems. 
 
IT system – Threat: Standardized threat catalogs support in defining individual threat scenarios 
for an enterprise's IT. Thereby, a scenario can be relevant for 1...n IT systems whereby mainly 
threats are regarded that may lead to hostile risks when quantifying. Therefore, the reference of a 
risk and a business process can be created after the quantification of the threat. In the context of 
vulnerability assessments, threats are being analyzed that jeopardize the proper operation of IT 
components and can therefore lead to noncompliant security objectives. A differentiation of threats, 
e.g. with regard to location and type of interface, has to be carried out.  
 
Threat – Risk: Threat scenarios that affect single or accumulations of IT systems here are carried 
over to quantifications. A quantification is the classification of a threat in regard to its probability 
of occurrence and impact. The levels of probability range from almost impossible to very certain, 
effects are classified by using a range of insignificant up to hostile. Intrinsic connections allow 
risks to be allocated to business processes through the relation of threats towards the IT systems. 
 
Risk – Measure: For the purpose of risk controllability, risk measures (i.e. controls) have to be 
implied that observe at least one risk component (the probability of occurrence or the impact) as 
well as they should reduce the individual classified value. Here, a decision to take a risk and, at the 
same time, keep a corresponding amount of capital as a reserve, is also to be considered as a IS 
measure. This special measure is then employed when the investment of the IS measure is higher 
than the amount of loss, quantified by the department. The quantification of threats finally leads to 
a survey of risks that have to be controlled as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: ORBIT – Risk matrix 
 
The risk matrix is separated into four parts – following industry best practices. In quadrant Q1, the 
focus lays on the control of accumulated risks. Here, it is analyzed if the risk also occurs in other 
sectors of business and if there are any correlations with other risks for instance. Shifting to Q2, the 
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criticalities of risks like those of Ri23 and Ri27 are of such height that they need constant observa-
tion. Risks that are categorized in Q3 should undergo yearly evaluation. In Q4, the main focus is 
laid on crisis management. Enterprises should be prepared for worst-case scenarios here for in-
stance. 
 
At the point of the risk assessment, the level of threat is defined considering all measures set up for 
risk control in this context. This so called net risk method is used as a hypothetical assignment of 
threat levels under the theoretical assumption that no minimizing measures were implemented 
(gross risk method) is not convenient as it doesn’t reflect the de facto situation. As far as further 
measures in regard to the net risks have to be planned, the corresponding risk can be evaluated at 
the next interval under consideration of the degree of implementation. The authors accentuate the-
reby that the implementation of a regular reassessment process has to be anchored in this manage-
ment system – starting to run after the implementation of relevant measures at the latest.  
 
4. Merging the Approaches: A generic Data Model for the Integrated Informa-
tion Security Risk Management 
 
After introducing BORIS and ORBIT, the current chapter intends to present a generic data model 
that bases on the merge of BORIS and ORBIT resulting in a powerful and practicable framework 
for the business and process focused information security risk management. This data model relies 
on the fact, that no matter what the management methodology finally is, at the end of the day, the 
person in charge for the information security risk management functions has to deal with certain 
key questions like budget, staff, services, strategy, skills, and certainly controls management (e.g. 
selection and application of proper measurements for the minimization of the information security 
risks). Thus, this person needs tools capable to support him in answering these questions. 
 
Starting to compare BORIS and ORBIT, one of the first results is that both models have a common 
nominator: The “control management”. No matter, where the need for the selection of a control (i.e. 
implementation of SPAM-filter, or a security awareness programs for instance) is driven from, it is 
finally based on a scorecard evaluation of security respectively risk drivers as well as on an appro-
priate analysis of the cost-benefit situation in this context. An integrated database which contains 
comprehensively the results of the scorecard evaluations (either from BORIS or/and ORBIT) then 
is leading to a selection of a control for the driver (a policy or risk for instance) identified. Thereby, 
to strongly base controls management here on business and economic principles, only those con-
trols will be implemented, which have passed the cost-benefit analysis successfully. Otherwise, 
because it might become traceable that some of the controls might cause higher investment than the 
expected benefit, they’ll be rejected. 
 
Thus, the role of ISM executives (i.e. CISO or CSO) can be supported in regard to decisions about 
the adequate control selection as well as it can enhance the productivity of the implemented con-
trols while at the same time the efficiency can be increased. Nonetheless, ISM will still have to deal 
with decisions and management regarding the budget, skills, strategy, service and people in the IS 
organization which are not focused on in this paper. Realistically and based on the actual expe-
rience of the authors, the merge of BORIS and ORBIT as visualized through Figure 5 is highly en-
ticing and promising to become a leading edge method for information security risk management. 
 
Regarding the defined goals at the beginning of this paper, the presented framework can fulfil all of 
them. As BORIS layer one holds a system for aligning business to security objectives supported by 
the linkage of the KCs business processes up to risks, R1 is fulfilled. As the scorecard system out-
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lined in the BORIS concept enables to visualize IS performance on a high level of aggregation, R2 
is reached in the consequence. 
 
Figure 5: Integrated Information Security Risk Management 
 
On the tactical layer, PRONOE is introduced to handle risk-investment oriented challenges. It holds 
a scorecard for assessing enterprises’ risk areas and supports in visualizing actual and debit state 
comparisons. Alternatively, ORBIT can be used in this context what collectively fulfils goal R3. 
Because both models are directly linked to the cost-benefit-toolbox of BORIS that is formed by its 
layers 2 and 3, offering support for dealing with concrete investment decisions, R4 is reached. 
Thereby, PRONOE offers the opportunity of calibrating different screws in regard to the individual 
denotation of a risk area, in regard to the interdependencies of risks as well as in regard to the ag-
gregation criteria for the management summary [17]. In addition to the cost-benefit-toolbox, the 
ECI and OCI methods help in identifying areas of necessary action from the bottom-up perspective 
what enables to reach goal R5. A program management cycle that can be overlapping BORIS, in-
cluding the ORBIT world, is rounding off the framwork in order to link the different tools in a 
planned and systematic matter, finally fulfilling R6. The structure of the framework is evaluated by 
interviewing several scientists and IS professionals as well as most parts of BORIS as well as 
ORBIT in its full structure are already implemented and running successfully in real-time environ-
ments of enterprises with world-wide presence.  
 
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The paper introduces a comprehensive model for the integrated security risk management, which is 
vital for any public or private organization. The higher the degree of implementation of the pre-
sented model, the higher is the expectation to see optimization of expenses on the one (i.e. minimi-
zation) and of the efficiency on the other hand (i.e. maximization of the effectiveness). The authors 
strongly believe that it is a matter of time where methodologies like the described ones will domi-
nate the behaviour of IS professionals. The main reason for this assumption is, BORIS and ORBIT 
as well as the introduced common framework “speak” the same language at the control level. 
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Although the paper presents a systematic and holistic concept, ongoing work has to be done. For 
instance, BORIS and ORBIT are productively used in industrial environments solitary but their 
integration is just on the design stage. Here, a detailed data-model has to be developed and further-
more used for the development of the database what is one of the most challenging but beneficial 
tasks. Indeed, the authors predict to have the integrated method fully supported by a combined tool 
soon to be finalized. Tremendous effort has to be spend to have this vision realized, and the effort 
itself has to be a subject of decision making and furthermore to show the positive economic impact, 
as any other “security control”. In other respects, any further work in this direction will become 
obsolete – which is not going to be the case, as the author experienced so far. Nevertheless, the 
authors believe that the current versions of BORIS and ORBIT already enable enterprises to over-
come several difficulties in the daily life of ISM. It helps to get a transparent insight into the gaps 
to identify not only what to do but what to do aligned to business goals and financial balance. 
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